A TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE

by

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INTRODUCTION

To begin with, such a title requires an explanation. Why would anyone try to construct a typology of genocide? The great majority of serious studies that deal with genocide, deal with a single case; usually the Holocaust, less often with the Armenians in Turkey, and vary rarely with other cases. In doing a study of a single case no typology is required, either because the case is treated as a unique event, or because the argument involves the internal sequence of circumstances that led to the genocide.

The need for some method of classification becomes apparent only when one is trying to deal with a large number of cases comparatively. In fact, in so doing one even becomes aware of the need for a rather rigorous and unambiguous definition; how else will one decide which cases belong in the study and which ones really represent a quite different phenomenon and thus should not be included. But even after this first step has been taken, the question arises whether all of the cases that do meet the criteria of the definition should be considered as falling into one large group. This question tends to answer itself after some preliminary work on some of the cases has been done. It turns out very quickly that genocides occur in quite different societies, under vastly varying circumstances, confronting quite different people, and resulting in dramatically different outcomes. Thus, treating all such cases as if they represented an undifferentiated phenomenon seems unlikely to lead to the kinds of results that are the aim of scholarly research. What we need is to classify together those cases that appear to have some crucial characteristics in common. If we can fit all observed cases into one of several such classes, then we can talk about a process of classification, the end result of which will be a typology.

The textbooks on research methods tell us that the classes in a typology must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Such a requirement is difficult enough to meet, but is not sufficient. We are not interested in imposing on our data some typology for the sake of order and neatness. A typology is a tool of research; unless it can be used as a tool in the analysis of the data, it is merely a frill that looks elegant, but leads neither to meaning nor to explanation. If our aim is to satisfy such requirements, then the question arises as to what to use as a basis of building a typology. It soon appears that typologies could be built around several criteria. Thus, one could look at minority-majority relations within a society as well as power relations between societies; one might classify genocides by the means employed as well as by the results achieved; or, one could consider causes as well as intentions. No doubt other bases for developing a typology could be added. And good reasons for using any of these could probably be developed. The choice will depend on the kinds of questions we want to explore. But the answer is really based on a hunch about the nature of the research to be undertaken. The very word 'research' tells us that we are entering the realm of the unknown; if we knew the answers beforehand, we would not be 'searching' for them. Thus, the adequacy of any particular typology can only be assessed in terms of the research results it facilitates producing.

The typology to be proposed here is based on the hunch that 'intent' is one such crucial criterion. If a definable 'group' of people was almost or wholly eliminated, but nobody intended this to occur...is this genocide? Some definitions of genocide do not include the intent of the perpetrator. However, the case made here is that such events - although equally regrettable - are not genocides and therefore should be called something else. This leaves us with trying to classify the kinds of intentions of the perpretrators and leads directly to a major difficulty: how does one prove or infer 'intent'?

One of the major reasons for engaging in the study of genocides from a historical and comparative perspective is to find out whether some kinds of societies are more likely to commit genocide than others. From this perspective, it seems that a typology based on intent might have a great deal of analytic utility. However, there are two problems with the criterion of intent: first, it is rarely easy to get good evidence on conscious intent and, second, intent may be either explicit or implicit. However the criterion of intent seems so important, and other criteria for constructing a typology seem to yield so little analytic gold, that these difficulties will simply have to be dealt with to the best of our ability. With these remarks in mind, we present here our attempt at what such a typology might look like. But first a look at what our predecessors have written on this topic.

EARLIER LITERATURE

All students of genocide are beholden to Raphael Lemkin and the delegates and staff who participated in the drafting of the United Nations Convention on Genocide.

The pioneering scholarly studies of genocide, published by Raphael Lemkin in 1933, 1935, and 1944, established a definition of genocide which laid out the approximate boundaries of the concept and identified a number of specific historical events within its perimeter. Lemkin defined genocide in 1944 as the coordinated and planned destruction of a national, religious, racial or ethic group by different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of the group with the aim of annihilating it physically or culturally. Those vital foundations which Lemkin noted were political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of the group. Genocide also included certain actions directed against individuals because they were members of a group - the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and the lives of individuals belonging to the group.

Lemkin gave equal weight to genocide by cultural oppression and genocide by mass killing. Genocide, he reiterated, "does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation". (Lemkin, 1944, p. 79). This observation may also indicate that Lemkin regarded social measures, rather than mass murder, as the technique most likely to be chosen by states engaging in genocide in the future.

Beneath the surface of his extremely broad concept of genocide, Lemkin succeeded in revolutionizing existing definitions of crimes against national groups and their proper place in international law. Some of the social and cultural elements in Lemkin's 1944 definition were already treated in international law under the rubric of "denationalization", while in the political discourse of his day they were commonly referred to by culturally specific terms such as "Germanization", "Magyarization", and "Italianization". Lemkin's conceptual breakthrough was his insight that genocide was a composite process involving several individual acts already defined as crimes under international law and other acts not yet covered in international legislation. The essence of Lemkin's proposed legal remedy was his insistence that international law must take account of states which formed the intention of physically and/or culturally annihilating national, religious, or racial groups, and define the implementation of such a process as a crime in its own right, whether or not conducted in time of war and whether or not other facets of international law were violated by the genocidal state. Lemkin was the first person to propose that implementation of cultural, economic, and social measures with the aim of physically or culturally destroying a group should be defined as criminal behavior under international law. In his view, genocide was "a composite of different acts of persecution or destruction" which had to be treated as a whole under the law, rather than in "piecemeal" fashion, in the manner of the

Hague Regulations. (Lemkin, 1944. p. 92). In this new perspective, some apparantly trivial practices not banned by the Hague Regulations should be proscribed when they were intended to undermine the physical or cultural survival of a national, religious, or racial group. (Lemkin, 1944, p. 92). For example, Lemkin contended that although there was no specific ban in the Hague rules against a government subsidizing children conceived by its soldiers with women nationals of an occupied area, this practice, employed by the Nazis in occupied Holland and Norway, should have been banned because it was part of a program aimed at the "Germanization" of Holland and Norway to the detriment of their national cultures.

Despite forays like these into the highways and byeways of genocide, the core of Lemkin's work was focused upon the intent of the perpetrator of genocide to destroy a people and/or their culture. While Lemkin believed that genocide in its modern form was a sophisticated process with many modes of implementation, he viewed it as a practice with ancient roots. Genocide was "an old practice in its modern development. . . ." The evolutionary premise of his analysis was that modern genocide had evolved from "wars of extermination, which occured in ancient times and in the Middle Ages . . . ." In his "classical examples of wars of extermination", Lemkin believed that "nations and groups of the population were completely or almost completely destroyed . . . ." In this category, Lemkin placed "the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C., the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in 72 A.D.; the religious wars of Islam and the Crusaders; the massacres of the Albigenses and the Waldenses; and the siege of Magdeburg in the Thirty Years' War". He also included the "special wholesale massacres (which) occured in the wars waged by Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane".

After the Middle Ages, Lemkin observed, the conception of war had evolved until international law incorporated the notion that wars should be "limited to activities against armies and states". (Lemkin, 1944, p. 80). Modern genocide had evolved until it assumed a new and more subtle form which did not necessarily involve the destruction of the individuals who were the members of the nation. The modern, developed form of genocide described by Lemkin in 1944 had two phases: phase one, "destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group;" and phase two, "the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor." The perpetrator state accomplished its goal by assimilating the oppressed population or by removing the population and colonizing the territory with its own nationals. The context of Lemkin's description indicates that his conception of this modern form of genocide, which had developed after "a long period of evolution in civilized society", referred primarily to cases of forced assimilation or mass deportation common in European society after 1900. (Lemkin, 1944, p. 79-80). These are cases which we believe are more appropriately referred to as ethnocide (see the discussion of this issue on page 15).

German practices in the Second World War, still underway while Lemkin wrote, combining the revival of ancient wars of mass extermination and the more modern form of genocide, caused Lemkin to describe a third form of genocide typified by the Nazi campaign to physically destroy the entire Jewish people. "German actions," Lemkin declared, "have surpassed in their unscrupulous character any procedures or methods imagined a few decades ago by the framers of the Hague Regulations. Nobody at that time could conceive that an occupant would resort to the destruction of nations by barbarous practices reminiscent of the darkest pages of history." (Lemkin, 1944, p. 90). The Germans, Lemkin charged, were making war against peoples, not just against states and their armies. They had revived genocide in its oldest most primitive form, wars of extermination

in their program for the eventual destruction of the Jews, the Poles, the Slovenes and the Serbs. They had adopted the newer policy of ethnocide and Germanization for peoples considered blood relatives of the Germans, such as the Dutch, Norwegians, Flemings, and Luxemburgers. (Lemkin, 1944, p. 80-82). Underlying German government behavior, Lemkin argued, was the Nazi goal of biological supremacy for the German people, even if the German state was defeated in the war. He found evidence for his view in Alfred Rosenberg's declaration in 1935 that "History and the mission of the future no longer mean the struggle of class against class, the struggle of Church dogma against dogma, but the clash between blood and blood, race and race, people and people." In the Nazi conception, Lemkin observed, "the nation, not the state, is the predominant factor." (Lemkin, 1944, p. 80-81). Reflecting on the Germans' "elaborate, almost scientific (genocidal) system developed to an extent never before achieved by any nation," Lemkin emphasized the great significance of genocide for the future of humankind and the need to revise international law to take full account of it. (Lemkin, 1944, p. 90).

In summary, then, Lemkin conceived of genocide as an ancient practice with modern variants. He described three types of genocide: (1) ancient and medieval genocide in which nations and groups were completely or almost completely destroyed; (2) a process which we call ethnocide, a modern form of genocide in which a culture was destroyed without an attempt to physically annihilate its bearers; and (3) Nazi genocide, which targetted some peoples and groups for physical annihilation and others for ethnocidal Germanization. Lemkin's typology of genocide was based on the intent of the perpetrator, but he did not explore the variety of subsidiary purposes and intentions. Although his approach took account of the historical dimension, he did not attempt to classify all cases of genocide, reserving his energy for the task of reviewing international law and advocating a convention proscribing genocide. His approach neglected

one major characteristic of the Nazi genocide and of several earlier cases: the Nazi attack on the Jews began with the murder of Jews who were German citizens, not citizens of a foreign, occupied state, and in a number of cases of medieval genocide the perpetrators also killed their own citizens. What Lemkin did not realize in the 1930's and 1940's was that twentieth century genocide would typically become a case of the state liquidating a group of its own citizens. Had he paid attention to the case of the Armenian genocide of 1915, Stalin's persecutions in the thirties, or the domestic aspects of the Nazi genocide against the German Jews, this facet of modern genocide might have played a more prominent role in his analysis.

All of these difficulties and problems surfaced in United Nation debates as a consequence of Raphael Lemkin's one-man campaign to bring into existence an international convention on genocide. What the UN Convention lacks in comprehensiveness and enforceability it compensates for with clarity. Excluding the annihiliation of a group on grounds of the political opinion of its members and failing to actually establish an international tribunal to render judgements on cases of alleged genocide, the United Nations Convention on Genocide of 1948, defined genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." (United Nations, Convention on Genocide, reprinted in Leo Kuper, 1981, Appendix I). Even a causal review of the United Nations definition of genocide reveals the existence of glaring differences between the text adopted by the General Assembly and Lemkin's definition. The United Nation's definition is much closer to our own. It excludes

ethnocide, although traces of Lemkin's intention to include it in the UN definition can be seen in clause (e) on the transfer of children from one group to another. Unlike Lemkin, the UN definition of genocide is focused almost exclusively on the physical destruction of a group by killing its members. As in Lemkin, intention is a sine qua non of the definition. In this respect, the UN definition follows Lemkin's observation that genocide was analagous to murder in criminal law. Moreover, the UN accepted Lemkin's recommendation that genocide should be a crime under international law "whether committed in time of peace or in time of war . . . ." (Article I of the UN Convention on Genocide). However, the UN went beyond Lemkin in the realm of domestic persecution of a group with the intention of destroying it by killing its members. As we have seen, Lemkin found it necessary to neglect such cases in his 1944 book. The UN Convention permits the laying of charges against a government for a genocide directed against its own citizens.

Virtually all previous authors writing on the problem of genocide can be distinguished from each other according to their treatment of motives for genocide. An interest in motives informs and links together the writing of Raphael Lemkin, Vahakn Dadrian, Helen Fein, Leo Kuper, and the authors of this essay. A disinclination to make much of motives characterizes the architects of the final version of the United Nations Convention on Genocide, as well as Hervé Savon and Irving Louis Horowitz. This interest or disinterest in motives strongly influences the implicit or explicit typologies of genocide found in each author's work.

We have already seen that the United Nations definition of genocide pivots on the intention of the perpetrator, avoiding any interpretation of the political or other motives which have often spurred states to commit genocide. This is also the approach taken by Hervé Savon in his 1972 work on genocide, Du Cannibalisme au Génocide. Savon's "attempt at typology" hangs on the result of genocide rather than the perpetrator's desires or intentions. Savon views

intent as a matter for the moralist or the courts since intentions are "often evasive and sometimes beyond comprehension." He is primarily interested in the social dynamics that make a genocide likely or probable. "What use of force, what geographic particularities, what meshing of rivalries, or defiance and of fears," he asks, "led this conflict into a war of extermination". (Savon, 1972, p. 23, 26-27).[1] Anxious to investigate the phenomenon of collective aggression, Savon categorizes the results of genocide and generalizes from outcomes. In his schema, genocides are committed by external perpetrators and internal perpetrators. The external perpetrators have generated two "results": "substitutions," in which the perpetrator seizes and gains control of land from others, a process exemplified by the conquest of the Indians of North and South America, as well as the destruction of the Bushmen of Southern Africa, and "devastations", in which the perpetrator destroys another people but does not stay on to occupy their land, as was the case of the Roman destruction of Palestine in the days of Hadrian. Savon classifies genocides committed by an ethnic majority against a minority living in its midst under a third category, "genocide of elimination," an outcome which he observes in the slaughter of the Tutsi by the Hutu majority of Rwanda in 1958. (Savon, 1972, p. 23-25).[1] Subtle and nuanced as Savon's questions are, a typology based on results has little predictive value. We are more interested in a typology which has the potential of illuminating the events leading up to genocide and the possibilities it may suggest about ways of interrupting the process before the outcome is determined.

Irving Louis Horowitz is another scholar who emphasizes outcomes over motives. In his 1976 study, Genocide, and his 1980 revision of the same work, Taking Lives, Horowitz develops a typology of human societies based on the notion that the fundamental distinction of the twentieth century is the distinction between societies that do and do not take the lives of people on behalf of

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1 page references are to the original French edition; quotations are from an unpublished translation by Roger Robilliard.

maintaining state power. It would be inaccurate to say that Horowitz swerves away from the issue of motive, but we think it would be fair to say that he sees genocide in a single dimension. In his view, genocide is a fundamental political policy employed by the state to assure conformity to its ideology and theory of the state. Starting from this perspective, Horowitz devises an eight part typology of modern societies in which the level of state-induced repression is the key variable. Genocidal societies occupy one extreme of the spectrum. They are defined as societies in which the state arbitrarily takes the lives of citizens who deviate from its ideology. Turkey in 1915 and modern Brazil are thus characterized. From genocidal societies, Horowitz's system takes up other authoritarian categories - deportation or incarceration societies, torture societies, harassment societies - until they gradually shade into more liberal societies - traditional shame societies, guilt societies, tolerant socieites, and, finally, a utopian dream, permissive societies. (Horowitz, 1976, p. 18-19; 42-43 and passim). Like most other writers on genocide, Horowitz's typology is based primarily on twentieth century cases. His unilinear approach, focused on outcomes, does little to explain the process whereby an authoritarian state resorts to genocide or to account for pre-twentieth century genocides. Moreover, as Horowitz himself candidly admits, a typology based on internal repression cannot account by itself for genocides conducted in foreign countries. Yet we cannot leave Horowitz without acknowledging that his discussion of the role of the state in genocide and his critique of the failure of modern social science to tackle the most pressing social issues of our day rings true.

Vahakn Dadrian occupies a central position in the literature on genocide. One of the first writers to devise a typology of genocide, actually the first post-war academic to do so in the English-language literature, Dadrian asserted in a 1975 essay that "the understanding of the role of the perpetrator (of

genocide) has paramount import; in fact it has primacy over all other considerations." Supporting this view, Dadrian argues that it is the perpetrator of genocide who supplies the three essentials of the process: legitimization, authorization, and rationalization. Dadrian also recommends attention to the level of violence and victimization and the scale of casualties among the victims as further indicators of the genocidal character of an assault on a people. (Dadrian, 1975, p. 203-204). Despite the clarity of Dadrian's preliminary discussion, particularly his emphasis upon perpetrator intent and motivation, his typology of genocide is somewhat disappointing. Dadrian describes five types of genocide: cultural genocide, in which pre-emptive assimilation is the perpetrator's aim; latent genocide, which is the result of activities with unintended consequences, such as civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental spread of disease during an invasion; retributive genocide, designed to punish a segment of a minority which challenges a dominant group; utilitarian genocide, putting mass killing at the service of economic exploitation; and optimal genocide, characterized by the indiscriminate slaughter of members of a group to achieve its total obliteration. In the latter category, Dadrian locates the Armenian and Jewish Holocausts. (Dadrian, 1975, p. 205-211). Dadrian's lumping together of intended and unintended genocide serves to weaken the rigor of his typology. We are also confused by the criterion which defines optimal genocide - the scale of casualties among the victims - in a typology which is designed to emphasize the intentions of the perpetrator. It seems to us that Dadrian has blended together in his typology the motives of perpetrators, unintended outcomes, ethnocide, and non-genocidal, though murderous, punitive expeditions. We learned a gerat deal from his discussion of the importance of perpetrator intent, but have not been able to use his typology effectively in our work.

The first major author to sketch a typology based primarily on the intentions of the perpetrator was Helen Fein, who addressed the matter in a long and thoughtful footnote that appears in her 1979 monograph, Accounting for Genocide: National Response and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust. Like Lemkin, Fein makes a distinction between pre-modern and modern genocide, but unlike Lemkin, who saw the mass killing of civilians as a defining characteristic of ancient and medieval genocide, Fein bases her division of pre-modern and modern upon the non-existence or existence of the nation-state. In her view, prior to the rise of the nation state genocides were primarily intended to fulfill two aims: in societies united by religious solidarity, they were intended to eliminate converts to another faith, while in societies united by tribal homogeneity, inter-tribal conflicts produced attempts to exterminate other tribes because the perpetrator believed that his antagonist could not be subdued or assimilated. Since the rise of the nation-state, Fein notes, three motives for genocide may be observed. Where pre-meditation has occurred, the group which dominates the nation-state has committed genocide either to legitimate "the existence of the state as the vehicle for the destiny of the dominant group" or to eliminate an aboriginal group blocking the expansion or development of the state. Previously unplanned genocides have been committed in nation-states when dominant groups reacted to political challenges by previously subordinated classes. Here the objective of the dominant group is to preserve its grip on the state by totally eliminating a rival elite or potential elite. (Fein, 1979, p. 7-8).

In two pages, Helen Fein has produced many fruitful ideas about classifying the motives for genocide. Yet it would be over-burdening her text, which was intended to define the context for her intensive study of the Holocaust, to require that it account for all previous cases of genocide. Understandably, there are omissions and gaps in Fein's outline which she might have remedied

if her study had focused on the problem of classification instead of the specific case of the Nazi program to exterminate the Jews. As her typology stands, we cannot find a place for genocides motivated by the desire to instill terror in other peoples to facilitate foreign conquest, nor can we see a place for genocides designed to enrich the murderers. We also do not see a category which would encompass the Roman destruction of the Cartheginians and other cases of genocide intended to completely destroy a traditional rival. These are categories which we have found useful in our own work on genocide.

We regret that Leo Kuper, the most profound student of the overall problem of genocide since Raphael Lemkin, has thus far eschewed the task of devising a typology of genocide. (Kuper, 1981, p.105) Kuper has come to the study of genocide most reluctantly. Yet he felt compelled to confront the issue, driven by the "realization that genocide is all too common in our own day, and that the organization charged with its prevention and punishment, the United Nations, responds with indifference, if not with condonation." (Kuper, 1981, p.9) Kuper's study of genocide in the twentieth century wrestles with the problem of genocidal process and motivation. His discussion of past genocides emphasises the motives of the perpetrator, which are loosely grouped around genocides designed to resolve religious, racial and ethnic differences, genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire, and genocides perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideology. However, he is particularly concerned with the increasing frequency of genocidal events in the modern period. Since modern genocides occur within nation states that have the character of plural societies, the creation of new plural societies during the period of colonization and decolonization becomesof particular significance. Under the heading of"related atrocities", Kuper discusses cases of mass political slaughter and attempts to decimate an economic class. Like ourselves, he regrets that the United Nations definition of genocide omits these last categories, but he is reluctant to amend it because it has such wide currency.

PROPOSED DEFINITION

We propose to use an expanded version of the definition contained in the UN Convention on Genocide. However, the emphasis here is on mass extermination as the end result. The various forms of persecution, oppression, and de-personalization which may lead up to the final extermination do not by themselves constitute a genocide. They are, of course, crimes that are dealt with in the various Hague Conventions and bills of human rights. But, because they occur frequently without leading to mass extermination, they will not be considered under our proposed definition. Thus, not every case of persecution, however objectionable, can be treated as a genocide. Such cases become relevant only when they become the preliminary steps leading to the extermination of a group.

It is with regard to the meaning of the term "group" that we propose to expand the UN definition. We propose that a group is any social aggregate that has some determining feature in common. Thus, in our sense, "group" would include not only national, ethnic, religious and racial groups, but also social, and economic ones. This means that in addition to the commonly cited cases we would include such groups as a religious sect, a social class, or an economic, military, political, or intellectual elite.

Genocide means the actual events of mass murder committed with intent to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a social group (as defined above).

Three additional comments seem to be in order: (1) The degree to which such extermination is completely successful is quite irrelevant. Given the limitations on the efficiency of human action, there have been survivors of almost every genocide. The fact of their survival does not negate that a genocide took place. (2) Not included in our definition are those cases where a group has disappeared although nobody intended it. There have been cases of natural catastrophes, including epidemics, which have had this result. (3) Finally, cases of the suppression of the social, cultural, and religious identity of a group without its physical extermination are also excluded from our definition. The term

ethnocide covers such cases adequately and it should be used to deal with such cases. This term seems to have appeared first in the French literature and deserves wider currency because it represents an important distinction.[1] This distinction lies not only in that nobody is killed, but also in the intentions and the processes that lead to the final result. The intent here is not to exterminate a 'worthless' or 'dangerous group,' but to incorporate a group because it will contribute something. The processes leading to ethnocide do not involve the dehumanizing aspects of those leading to genocide; neither do they ordinarily threaten the health and survival of the victims.

A FOUR-FOLD TYPOLOGY

1. THE CREATION OF TERROR

A group or population may be terrorized by many means short of genocide. However, when genocide is resorted to the real target of the terror is not the victims, but third parties who are seen as potentially troublesome. The victims will be accused of some fancied or real offence against the perpetrator; the punishment characteristically does not fit the crime because it is intended to intimidate third parties.

The classic case here is that of the Mongols during their empire building period (Saunders, 1971, Ch. 4). Frequently they offered to those peoples into whose lands they planned to expand a choice between submission and total extermination. Since they carried out their threat with cold-blooded bureaucratic efficiency, their potential enemies increasingly opted for submission to their rule, their laws, and their taxes.

The Athenians treated Melos with equal cruelty because their wish to maintain their independence was seen as undermining Athens' hegemony over its allies. (Thucydides, Book 5).

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[1] "Ethnocide: destruction de la culture d'un peuple; à distinguer de génocide, massacre d'un peuple" p. 296 Dictionnaire du Bon Français par Jean Girodet, Paris: Bordas, 1981.

2. THE ELIMINATION OF THREAT OR OF A TRADITIONAL RIVAL

Throughout much of history, especially in classical times, the relations between neighbouring peoples consisted of long series of raids, battles, and conquests. Peace treaties rarely were more than a truce that permitted the losers to reorganize and to plan their revenge. In order to prevent such revenge, the conquerors frequently decided to totally destroy their enemy or rival, razing their cities and destroying their populations by a combination of massacres and slavery.

The empire of the Hittites was so efficiently wiped out that it took a long time and a good deal of luck before modern archeologists managed to unearth traces of it. (Gurney, 1975; Macqueen, 1975). Much better documented is the fate of Carthage. The several Punic Wars failed to settle the struggle for predominance between Rome and Carthage in spite of the fact that they were incredibly costly in terms of manpower and resources - even by modern standards. They not only impoverished both city states, but also threatened their survival. Both had reached the point where one had to eliminate the other. In the end, it was almost a series of accidents that gave the advantage to Rome which, not content with the security inherent in developing a client state, had second thoughts and proceeded to raze Carthage to the ground and to sell what population survived into slavery. (Warmington, 1960).

Many similar examples might be cited from the history of the Assyrians, from the Old Testament, from the short-lived Zulu empire of Shaka, etc. (Jastron, 1971; Ch. III, Old Testament, Joshua 6 & 8, Deuteronomy 2 & 3, I Samuel 15; Eugene V. Walter, 1969, Ch. 7).

An interesting question might be raised tangentially about the disappearance of this type of genocide from modern history. The answer probably is that, in spite of the greater scale of contemporary warfare, modern nation states are simply too large for this type of extermination.

3. ECONOMIC ENRICHMENT

Real or potential wealth has always attracted covetous enemies. In extreme cases, such enemies have not shrunk back from eliminating those groups that owned such wealth or that stood in the way of acquiring it. The forms of such wealth can vary greatly: from the control of trade routes to the ownership of land and to access to important resources. Therefore, this type of genocide is as old as history and as common as greed.

When Philip the Fair of France found it increasingly difficult to finance his ambitious wars of expansion, he first expelled the Jews from France and confiscated their property. When he discovered that they were not nearly as rich as popular myth would have it, he expelled the Italian bankers. While they were richer than the Jews, they also disappointed him. Finally, he focused on the group that was by far the richest in world; unfortunately the Knights of the Temple could not be simply expelled because they were under the direct protection of the Pope. By accusing them of heresy and extracting confessions under torture, he eventually succeeded in destroying the order and acquiring its immense wealth. (Barber, 1978). Many more examples could be cited from the history of colonial expansion right up to the present time when aborigines in several parts of South America are becoming the victims of development. (Davis, 1977). They are sharing the fate of a number of North American Indian tribes who stood in the way of European expansion into North America during the 17th century. (Wagner, 1964).

4. GENOCIDES COMMITTED IN FULLFILLMENT OF AN IDEOLOGY, BELIEF, OR THEORY-LEGITIMATING A NEW STATE OR REGIME

This category, first suggested by Norman Cohn, at present has only the status of a hypothesis that ought to generate research to test it. The reason we find it intriguing as a potentially fruitful approach is that the last 100 years have seen such a proliferation of new states and/or regimes and that so many of them have become the perpetrators of modern genocides.

We are combining here ideologies, beliefs, and theories - an unlikely combination on the surface of it - because and insofar as they all justify the means to achieve idealized ends. The definition of the ends implicitly, and more often explicitly, includes the specification of real and/or potential enemies. When new states or regimes arise proclaiming such ends, they tend to acquire credibility and legitimacy by defending these ends against real, potential, or imaginary enemies. When the enemy is real, this usually leads to wars; when the enemy is potential or imaginary, this may lead to the invention of pseudo-conspiracies against internal groups. The processes set into motion against such groups may then escalate from repression to mass persecution and to genocide.

The most extreme case to illustrate this category is of course the Nazi Holocaust. (Hilberg, 1967). It is also the one that is easiest to analyze because both the ends of Hitler's race theory, and the means by which to achieve these ends, were clearly and publicly stated. These statements were so prominent that it is hard to think of another basis for the legitimation of Hitler's regime.

In the many other cases that may be cited to fit this category, the perpetrators did not provide us with equally clear and public statements. Turkey even denies that the genocide of the Armenians took place. (Boyajian, 1972). In the case of Russia, the control of information was and remains so tight that it took many years before the knowledge leaked out of the country that certain groups were eliminated during Stalin's terror; to this day it is not known exactly what happened to some of the nationalities persecuted under Stalin. (Antonov-Ovseyenko, 1981; Conquest, 1970). In many of the more recent cases the data are not yet available that would allow us to decide whether what occured was a case of mass persecution or of genocide. However, while the authors are planning to pursue this line of inquiry, its present state is that

of a hypothesis based on some interesting hunches that remain to be explored.

THE PROBLEM OF INTENT

Explicit intent is not nearly as rare as one might think. Hitler was only the last one in a long line of perpetrators who made no bones about their intentions. Equally explicit were Ghengis Khan and his successors in the rule of the Mongols, the Athenians, the Romans, and several of the leaders of colonization in the Americas and in Oceania.

Implicit intent is a more difficult notion because it is not meant here as an inference about the motives of the perpetrators, but rather as the result of the analysis of the structures and the processes that lead to genocide. What we have in mind here is what some sociologists have called 'structural effects'; i.e.: that certain social processes involving certain social structures lead to specifiable outcomes that the social actors may be quite unaware of. Unlike in the cases of explicit intent, these outcomes are always probability statements: they are likely to occur, but do not always occur.

One reason why, in this case, they would not always occur is that genocide is the extreme manifestation on a range of alternatives. Thus, the structural effect may manifest itself on a range of phenomena from discrimination and persecution to massacres and finally genocides. In addition, there are of course some other ways in which a new state or regime may legitimate itself.

Thus, while explicit intent is a relatively straightforward notion, implicit intent or structural effect is the result of a rather difficult analysis. However, it is not to be confused with the notion of the unanticipated consequences because the latter refers either to fortuitous events or to ignorance or naivité about the consequences of deliberate actions.

CONCLUSION

In this exploratory paper we have attempted to focus on a definition and a typology of genocide that promise to be useful as tools of research. Our interest in doing this arose from the problems we encountered teaching a course on the history and sociology of genocide in which we attempted to deal with cases from all periods of history and from all regions of the world.

The definition of the UN Genocide Convention is the most widely known and accepted one. However, it was the result of political compromises and was not primarily devised to serve as a tool of research. Since genocides are perpetrated by states, an assembly of states' representatives does not seem the most propitious body to adopte a scholarly perspective. Thus, we did not hesitate to modify that definition. In fact, we would have been tempted to coin a new term if we had been able to find an appropriate one. The present term leaves us with a rather obscure distinction between genocide and mass persecution that we have not found a way of handling adequately.

The typology we propose also emerged from our need to group the material in our course in a meaningful manner. For the purposes of analysis we found it not meaningful to lump together all cases in which an attempt was made by one group to eliminate another group. The disturbing frequency with which mass persecutions and genocides occur in the 20th century led us to look for something they have in common. (Kuper, 1981, passim). Thus, we arrived at our fourth category. The UN being an assembly of states and perpetrators also being states, it seems naive to assume that the Genocide Convention will have a deterring effect. Perhaps it is equally naive to assume that better insight into the processes that lead to genocide will have a deterring influence. But we feel that nothing is to be lost by trying.

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